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Theatrum Philosophicum : Thinking Literature and Politics with Walter 
Benjamin.  
By Oscar Guardiola-Rivera  
 
1. Theatrum Philosophicum: Reintroducing the Play of Chance. 
Before the apotheosis of war happened in the lands of our childhood, 
experience was passed down through the generations in the form of tales, 
images and stories. These also conveyed a sense of the inter-temporality of 
justice, of intergenerational justice and the secret pact made between our 
ancestors and the younger generations, providing the latter with the power to 
survive the most violent onslaughts and through play, role-play and tech-tools 
crack the world open.  
After the apotheosis of war, however, the fragile human bodies that 
emerged out of death from above and the killing fields where coffins with no 
remains pile up as an artwork of the future, seemed invisible and mute. They 
may want to be seen, but have been spirited away; they may speak, but nobody 
wants to listen. Like the ghost in Hamlet, we’ve been rendered unable to 
commune with and communicate the “forcefield of destructive torrents and 
explosions” to those who should listen.1 
Instead, all we get is the repetitive news cycle and the poor jargon of 
Twitter. These feed no one; being “poor in noteworthy stories”, they can neither 
catalyze the movement found in the experience of a land in anguish, nor de-form 
the given world beyond imagination the way dreams and fantasy play do. 
Instead, they feed obedience by mythologizing history and social forces into fate 
as well as the illusion of the juridical-psychic unity of individuals: for example, 
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the imagery of self-propelling markets and the declarative language of states of 
emergency and crisis. And yet, precisely because of this the apparently 
redundant forms of literature, imagery and textuality –play- become full of 
pathos, highly charged with electric energy, and their seeming obsolescence or 
untimeliness, becomes the condition of their critical power.2  
Walter Benjamin, never given to the trappings of nostalgia wishing to 
revive the traditions of the past, saw in this light the lyric poetry of Baudelaire, 
the detective-fiction of Edgar Allan Poe, and the utopian fantasies of Fourier, 
among others. He wasn’t the only one to connect the untimeliness of these 
literary forms with the possibility of communicating experience in spite of the 
experience of catastrophe and the catastrophe of experience in the wake of war, 
capitalism and spectacle. But he was unique in emphasizing the power of the 
play of words and images to lure and magnetize affections speculatively, 
cracking not just the world but also time open.3 
Children and actors invest radically in the sort of performances that take 
place in play, insofar as what they get out of their living experiences in their 
respective milieus and practices isn’t related to having some certainty about 
winning or losing. Their radical investment in events accelerating or slowing 
down time generates dimensions and milieus, intensifying life in what seems 
inert or devitalizing animated beings and fostering in them a regression towards 
instinct, and therefore traveling back and forth between logical and actual 
possibility. 
  In general terms, we call “rituals” the kinds of empirical events that have 
the status of both actualizing a possibility and in doing so acting in a way that 
moves from maintaining and preserving a fragile promise to its actualization in 
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the future. They involve dramatizations (often, of violence) that produce a kind 
of textuality, which the audience participates in and experiences as a sticky 
interface between actual performance and poetic inscription, scene or staging, 
thereby recasting from then onwards social or cosmological situations 
experienced before as uncertain or traumatic.  
 Ritual has its most powerful effect by bringing into effect a change of state 
in its prime actors “as well as in the cosmology that is its frame” by realizing as 
new a space and time presumed as its pre-condition “through a sequence of 
actions in which effects create causes or conditions of possibility that take shape 
only in retrospect”, but are carried into the present and the future. In general, 
philosophers and anthropologists call the creative force of text, language and of 
speech acts uttered in rituals “performative”. After J. L. Austin’s analysis of the 
performative and Jacques Derrida’s, Drucilla Cornell’s and Judith Butler’s work 
on performativity and the symbolic, also in the wake of theories of ritual as 
communication in archeology and anthropology with implications on 
personhood and the creation of options and leverages, it would be best to speak, 
as I do, of the “retro-futuristic performative” as central to a renewed 
understanding of the play of promises and their failure or actualization.4  
 Such philosophical understanding of play, which I’ve termed here 
textuality or in a wider sense philosophical theatre, finds its conceptual persona 
in “the sentry of dreams”. Miguel Abensour borrows him from Victor Hugo’s 
L’Homme qui rit apropos of Benjamin. Benjamin’s philosophical heteronym is a 
character named Ursus, who plays the role of the paradigmatic beggar 
philosopher, the discomforter, with regard to his pupil Gwynplaine whose 
utopian fantasies of social justice the master knows will be seen as dangerous by 
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the rulers. “A philosopher is a spy or a detective, and Ursus, sentry of dreams, 
kept a close eye on his pupil”. Making Abensour’s words ours, “Walter Benjamin 
is a sentry of dreams”, a philosopher-detective searching for what can be 
salvaged from the interrupted collective dreams of the last two centuries, all the 
while keeping a close eye on the way dreams and fantasies fascinate us 
(fascination of abomination, after Conrad). To awake ourselves from what had 
been the existence of our parents, fascination of abomination, we need to 
reintroduce a sense of absolute risk and the play of chance in existence and 
social life.5  
 One could say about play what Benjamin says about the perennial player, 
the gambler: “Life has only one real charm –the charm of gambling. But what if 
we do not care whether we win or lose?”6 Quoting Baudelaire in this text, 
Benjamin would know for he was a gambler himself. The gambler, the Cynic 
beggar philosopher, slaves and monsters, the ragpicker, the refusing clerk, the 
Amazon, the prostitute, the man of the crowd, the detective, the cleaner; all of 
them are figures of poverty and poor images themselves; what if they gathered 
and acted politically without care for wins or losses?   This line of questioning 
ties in with Baudelaire’s interest in E. A. Poe’s “analysis of the eccentrics and the 
pariahs of this world”, a phrase that according to Benjamin corresponds also to 
the self-portrait introduced by Auguste Blanqui in his L’Eternité par les astres: 
the image of the discomforter, she/he/it who interrupts the finitude of given 
time, the metrics of the horizontal and the vertical (also the vertical gaze of 
apotheosis and violence) in the direction of the infinite, the speculative and the 
absolute – risking his life in the fire this time, in now-time, danger time.  
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 Crucially, the point of invoking these images of poverty has nothing to do 
with the virtue and morality of gamblers and the poor, or their supposed lack 
thereof. Rather, it concerns both the kind of risk involved in their action and the 
effervescent quality of the time of risk and action. This includes the capacity of 
images, utterances and performances to produce a dramatic intensification of the 
affects they lure as well as their insistence on another course (of history, of 
possibility) at the heart of the event.  
 To be more precise, it concerns the coproductive and mutually catalytic 
relation between security-certainty and risk-uncertainty, or the sense in which 
speculative images and propositions both require and retro-futuristically 
produce a milieu that gives them their consistency and justification: whereas 
some particular certainty could be produced by lifelong ritual performance and 
practice (for instance, the methodical practice of profit-making) in this case 
uncertainty would remain a generic existential condition that couldn’t be 
resolved in this life, despite one’s ethical efforts. Such a life would then constitute 
a continuing effort “to reset the relation between certainty and uncertainty, with 
profit-making in business as a constant effort and salvational uncertainty as 
background reality” and imaginary framework given by the civic “theological 
model”   (as Max Weber taught us).7  
 Something else is required: the co-staging of certainty and uncertainty 
that recasts the latter and changes the perspective of participants, who wake up 
to the possibility of another course of history and its actualization, come what 
may. The question of another course of action, for either event or history, isn’t 
postponed or deferred to the space of utopia but becomes an urgent one posited 
every time in each act as a lightning-like image that makes up the battle at all 
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levels of existence, without certainty as to victory or defeat. This image, flashing 
forth in the Now (neither the Old nor the New) of performativity, running 
through the hesitations attached to each act as it plays out, is what must be 
seized in order to both hold on to and let go of the world of dreams of Yesteryear 
or the bliss of the Everafter. The operation of salvage that is effected in this way, 
and only in this way, can ever be accomplished solely ”for the sake of what in the 
next moment will be irretrievably lost”, without hope of salvation, without 
reservation or hope of restoration and return, Benjamin says. Isn’t this 
technology of awakening what Benjamin terms, precisely, the dialectical image?8      
 In other words, two kinds of technologies of anticipation can be 
distinguished in our understanding of play, image recognizability, and the time of 
risk and action. First, ritual and practice appear as part of a nearly universal 
apparatus for hedging, producing routine and regularity (standards, norms, 
metrics) as well as the kind of predictability associated with the mythical notion 
of eternal return. As is the case in the methodical ritual practice of profit-making, 
which Weber theorized as “the spirit” of capitalism and writers from the Jesuit 
jurist-theologians of early modernity to Sade and Fourier in the nineteenth 
century explored and experimented with in their texts, technologies of hedging 
are also subjugating of time and nature, absorbing all that is unexpected or 
unfamiliar about the latter within grasped regularities elevated to the condition 
of law-like repetitive patterns.  
 Second, once pushed to the background, uncertainty returns as the reality 
to be dealt with via rituals of redemption that would recover a sense of the 
harmonious play between technology and nature in the projection of a Golden 
Age, either as a past in need of restoration or the bliss of the ever after. If the first 
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technology produces the One (in contrast to nature, thus as a super-natural 
being that demands full investment from persons), the second technology aims 
to produce the Many or the Crowd in sync or “harmony” with nature; that is, as a 
connected-natural being that demands little investment from the collective by 
engaging in repeated experimentation via three operations--isolation, 
articulation (the obligation of speaking or confessing, passing through language) 
and ordering or classification (producing sequences that aren’t of the order of 
syntax but that of metrics)- thereby delivering the Individual, the man in the 
crowd, out of play. 
 Benjamin alluded to these two technologies early on, in a fundamental 
text from 1936: note I of the French version of The Work of Art in the Age of Its 
Technological Reproducibility, which he translated together with Pierre 
Klossowski. The first technology originates in social ritual, he says, “the first 
technology excluded the autonomous experience of the individual. Every magical 
experience was collective” and involved full investment from persons, up to 
sacrifice. And while the first comprises a project of subjugation and colonization 
of nature, “the origin of the second technology is to be found in the moment 
when, guided by an unconscious scheme, man learns for the first time to distance 
himself from nature. In other words, the second technology is born in play”, 
engendering a new relationship to nature, aiming to find “a harmony between 
nature and humanity”.9  
 In this context, modernity isn’t so much a progression from the first 
“hedging” ritual-technologies to the second “play” individual-making metric-
technologies, but the theatre of a battle between the two. Liberal and social-
democrat reformists take their cue from the subjugation of nature that informs 
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their belief in progress, in an “infinite perfectibility -an infinite ethical task-“ that, 
Benjamin declares, is but the other side of “the representation of the eternal 
return.” Proper to the first technology and its concept of subjugated nature, these 
two illusions -progress and repetition- are complementary. “They are the 
indissoluble antinomies in the face of which the dialectical conception of history 
must be developed.”10 This is modernity as dream and phantasmagoria, as our 
centuries prove to be the time of repetitions in which the Old wins out through 
the very experience of the New. Thus, the problem with the New is that it turns 
out to be the very negation of movement: it “engenders the return of myth which, 
wearing the mask of the New, reveals itself to be the terror and catastrophe of 
repetition”, as Abensour explains apropos of Benjamin’s contrasting invocation 
of Baudelaire, Fourier and Blanqui (also Sade) as founders of textuality.11  
 Therefore, reintroducing the play of chance in existence and social life 
isn’t a matter of novelty, let alone fashion or the certainty of return (neither as 
restoration of the past nor as profit, secured through the deferral of a different, 
unexpected future), but to unleash the lightning-like power of ritual to articulate 
events differently and to lure, capture, and recast the real concerns (hatred and 
struggle, or “combinatory play”, as in Fourier’s utopia) within a machinery of the 
passions. This conception of the act and the justifications for action envisages a 
move beyond morality -destructive of the history of ethics, or moral history. 
Rather than appealing to the virtue of the poor, for instance, the point is to lure 
and intensify the hesitation and concern in their action, the worry felt at that 
moment, the forks in the road that come to be in this action or lack thereof. 
  It can be said of all actions and justifications, in this respect, that they’re 
mixtures of possibilities and actualities. If so, speculative performances and 
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propositions aren’t choices or judgments, and they don’t make decisions for the 
world; rather, they recast uncertain conditionals and events differently, so that 
for the possibility of another course of history to acquire consistency and 
actuality it must lure and intensify the real worries that predict them at least in 
part (one could speak of a “prophetic gaze” in this precise sense). Such affects of 
hatred and combat develop in the memories of the participants, in texts and 
literary or historical-philosophical works and images or ritual refusals as they 
both depict and enact the combat’s explosive unfolding. An “art of war”, one 
might call it, but not so much “a new art of war” as a lightning-like art of war that 
emerges suddenly in the Now and, exploding time from within, as a spark or a 
bomb, situates or institutes and constitutes a milieu of consistency – a new 
dimension.  
 Ultimately, the relevance of a speculative (dialectical) image or 
proposition has to do with making sense and the constitution of our actual and 
near-future world as a world-in-the-making: what it inherits as a result of its 
secret pact with the past, and the power of the possibilities that continue to have 
a latent or weak presence, its futures and tendencies, which raise the question of 
inter-temporal justice. 
 
2.  On the Uses of Force: Inter-temporal Justice and the Maximal 
Intensification of Experience. 
Rather than to conceive of justification in the normal sense of judgment 
(the judgment of God, or the command/demand of love and obedience by a 
super-human being  -a King or President, a result of first technology) it would be 
better to speak of the maximal intensification of our lived experience (giving 
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value to all existence, the importance assumed by ways of seeing and feeling that 
are specific play combinations of each existent, affirmative of what matters here 
and now and thus constitutive of nature itself).  
 And instead of situating the aims of our actions in the space of utopia, it 
would be better to situate or recast utopia in the time-dimensionality of play 
cleared by second technology, which renews childhood and lets go of nature. It 
may be best to speak of uchronies rather than utopias, and of a technology that 
“appears as the spark” or the bomb that “ignites the powder of nature” instead of 
absorbing it, as Benjamin says.12 
  Also, the power of ritual shouldn’t be understood here reductively, as 
mere hedging against danger through metaphorical standardization, but rather, 
as opening up an interval, a time-gap between the present and the future, in 
which the effervescence of collective retro-futuristic performance produces, 
forcefully and with electricity (as Durkheim taught us) a sort of conviction that is 
performative (as J. L. Austin and Judith Butler taught us) but also constitutive 
and metaphorically transformative of the force of all social institutions and 
conventions in ordinary social life. 
 We’re speaking of action as a ritualized encounter that produces its own 
conditions of possibility. The collective effervescence of the interval, which can 
be technologically mediated, is the moment when certainty is produced out of 
uncertainty because social uncertainty is recast in the ritual process by the very 
participation of all actors and players who accept to take part in and collaborate 
in the ritual process. Ritual actors and brothers/sisters-in-arms are restless and 
compulsive collectors and archivists. They appropriate through incorporation 
(rather than plunder and property), rescuing the tone of inaudible voices and the 
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forensic traits of disappeared bodies issued forth from images, analogous to 
films that reapproriate “found” poor images turning them into engrams, frames 
and montages of attractions. This operational procedure, bringing forth the 
interval, is a matter survival. It’s neither love (as both Critchley and Zizek 
believe, oblivious to its entanglement with myth) nor fascination (of 
abomination). Action is extemporaneous, uchronistic or unexpected (rather than 
predictable or anachronistic) invention. The best example here is interlocution 
with ghosts and ancestors, in the fashion of Hamlet’s Marcellus.13 
  This means the true risk of an action lies not in the space of standards and 
probabilistic calculation but is the risk of arriving at an agreement in any sort of 
contingent claim in the absence of any reliable (stochastic, probabilistic, or 
rational-managerial) model of prior instances. This is absolute risk, or as I prefer 
“gratuitous” risk, the kind of which is involved in action taken irrespective of 
whether one cares for safety or knows beforehand with any certainty whether 
the outcome would be a win or lose. In true (Hegelian) speculative mood this 
means radically investing all, one’s life in taking action without reservation.  
What looms in the background of this most important of Benjamin’s 
thoughts is a certain conception of time as the unquantifiable unknown -the open 
future; and following from that, a concept of historical change as the result of 
contingent claims advanced by the various ghostly figures of the poor when they 
fall on the side of objects without reservation, and having fallen, they and their 
seemingly dead objects speak to the living, coming from the depths, in a voice 
that the latter cannot recognize (for instance, as filmed subjects or radio-
theatrical events) and in doing so question the foreclosure of the future.  
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 The techno-human principle derived from Benjamin’s conception of time 
and transformative action can be distilled into one word: interruption. The task 
isn’t only to interpret history but to dive into and invest in it, in its radical 
transformation, from the perspective of the effervescent moments that interrupt 
the continuity of time foreclosed. In such moments of dramatic experimentation, 
the action transmutes “a technical operation into a human event”. Benjamin 
speaks in this sense of a “laboratory of the dramatic”.14 
 The Paulinian concept of time as kairós, which the Jewish founder of 
Christianism uses at least eight times in his Letter to the Romans to refer to “now-
time”, also lurks behind these photo-electric reflections on time, risk and 
action.15 Let’s also consider in this context the messianic notion of the return of 
the ghostly and the dead (advent, parousía), which immediately evokes images of 
final judgment and the interruption of history from the perspective of the poor 
and the fallen as both denunciation and utopia: the times and things to come. In 
this context the notion of the “to come” acquires the meaning and sense of 
physical presentation, of bringing spirits (such as the disembodied voices of the 
fallen of history coming from radio and cinema, poor and lost images to be found 
in the archive of history, in the dream-like slumber of capitalist culture) back to 
their bodies. The latter, says Benjamin, is the power of (experimental) theatre in 
alliance with radio and cinema: to immobilize the image in motion, the course of 
the action, obliging spectators to take position in relation to the process and 
actors in relation to their role, interrupting the flow of the normal and the legal. 
“The exposition of a physical presence”, as Benjamin observes. Now the point 
moves away from the civic-theological closer to the theatrical and to combat, the 
ritual and the political: to construct the people and their cause in the image of 
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absolute risk and performative force, radical investment, and time-creating 
action as per Baudelaire’s dramatic play of rags and tatters: in the latter, having 
taken a step into the abyss, there’s no going back.16  
 The point resonates also with Adorno’s idea that the only act of thinking 
likely to bear cognitive fruit is one that takes place in free fall, a fonds perdu, 
without reservation.17 “The vertigo which this causes is an index veri; the shock 
of inclusiveness”, or, the open.18 Adorno’s take on (living, intellectual) experience 
in this passage posits that a concept that is to pass into a moral-political image of 
freedom will throw itself to the objects, onto the side of all that has been turned 
into a thing, “embracing a world of forces and matter, which lacks any original 
stability and sparks the sudden shock of the open: a freedom that is terrifying, 
utterly deterritorializing and always already unknown. Falling means ruin and 
demise as well as love and abandon, passion and surrender, decline and 
catastrophe”, corruption or destruction as well as liberation or a transformative 
condition –from things into people and vice versa.19  
 Liberation-destruction takes place in the open and as the opening of what 
I’ve called the interval, as the stage for metaphorical transformation and 
philosophical theatre. It doesn’t necessarily entail ultimate (social) death or utter 
power over life and death just as falling does not entail falling apart. It can also 
mean that arbitrary power (the kind that’s often identified with all-powerful 
rulers who make themselves the equivalent of gods through the use of violence 
that Benjamin calls “mythic”) can be and has been limited through the 
(performative) creation of institutions that not only head off the danger of utter 
violence but uses its force to bind (as the giver and receiver are bound by a gift), 
thereby bringing into effect a change of state in the prime actors of the 
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instituting performance as well as in the cosmology that’s its frame. Thus, also, 
bringing about a world presumed as the precondition of both institutions and 
performances through the sequence of actions in which effects create causes or 
conditions of possibility that take shape only retroactively. Such use of force, 
constitutive of a people, of their actions beyond any justification through God’s 
judgment or command, as “pure” means opposed to ends-oriented morality, 
taking on full responsibility as ourselves or as members of a community (as 
individuals or dividuals), anthropologists call “sacred” and Benjamin terms 
“divine”.20  
 This retro-creativity has been identified primarily as a linguistic effect, 
but there’s no reason why it cannot be extended to the concrete effects of the 
political imagination, the combination between the utopian and protest or 
critique, the prophetic vision and voice. The force that binds in any 
institutionalizing ritual process reveals a logic of reciprocity and alterity, gift and 
countergift that may be said to precede any actual exchange. The interval 
emerges in between gift and countergift, denunciation and the time to come, the 
historical and ahistorical strata within utopia considered as a form of the 
collective dream.  
 Put otherwise, objects and gifts in the ritual process don’t create ties 
between monadic individuals but between parts thereof, violent and volatile. If 
my ritual gesture of reciprocity and alterity (an extended hand, which both 
indexes a contingent claim and hands it over) meets no receiving gesture (a 
receiving hand), war follows.21 Thus, violence operates here in a dual register: 
first, for simplification, drawing lines where otherwise one might see only 
complex networks of human relations, bringing asymmetries in to the open, and 
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then, second, against simplification, in the sense that if it’s true that the quality of 
sovereign power is to define its subjects as a single people then, prior to any war 
between different peoples, is the war between the people subjected and the 
sovereign-ruler that subjects them.     Isn’t this in fact what Marx called living 
labor?22 
 
3.  The Gratuity of Risk: On the Relation Between Armed Struggle and 
Finance.  
In other words, the model of action invoked here after Benjamin is the 
gratuity of risk. This means, on the one side, breaking up with the tendency to 
manipulate nature or reality and ultimately subject it to domination, control and 
subsumption. Such act of rupture must take place first in the hearts of militants 
and their political desire. Put otherwise, the correct answer to the question 
raised by critical philosophy at least since Kant “what can we know, hope or 
believe and do?”, which arguably boil down to the practical question of belief and 
action, is “nothing”. However, it’s because of that inconstancy of will or lack of 
ultimate ground that we act, taking real risks. This can be understood as an 
existential demand to live our lives in the most meaningful sense of the term 
“option”, rather than simply manage it.  In this respect, liberation and freedom 
are the opposite of a well-calculated hedged financial operation; perhaps is 
better to say that the meaning of liberation/freedom comes closer to that of an 
expanded understanding of leverage.  
 On the other side, this involves a kind of realism about the time 
dimension: if there’s nothing we can know, hope or believe, no ultimate ground, 
ends-oriented morality or end-of-history projected into the future or scripture as 
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the bliss of the ever after, then the force and legitimacy of an action emerges 
radically, here and now, from the denunciation of present and concrete 
situations. This is what in their reflections on the concreteness of the dream of 
justice Latin American Liberation philosophers call “propheticism”, different 
from but related to “utopia”.23 They refer, simply, to enacting vision and spirit –
which renews all things- as opposed to the legalizing of ritual performance as 
habit, and to protest as well as forward-looking project in opposition to the 
countable verification of results and the calculation of inputs and outputs.  
In this respect, Liberation thinkers are the true successors of Benjamin, 
and Latin America the place and time where his intuitions become realizable.  To 
make or change history is to create here and now those possible times and things 
to come. If and when it comes (advent, the arrival of “the man of lawlessness” or 
the antinomian attitude, living corporality, a presence revealed in action) it will 
arrive in history not as the result of will or a managed project, but in surprising 
and contradictory ways. This is to say that the advent-event may be considered 
imminent, and yet, the timing is uncertain since it’s unknown. If such is the case, 
then historical ruptures are violent and “catastrophic”, i. e. analytically 
unpredictable yet utopian.  
 The alternative or “new world will be a landscape”, or a dreamscape, and 
“not paradise. The only freedom of action for humans, the only possibility to stop 
being the spectator of one’s own life is to engage in actions of resistance and 
creation that correspond to the situation”. This is so because, if the advent of 
historical ruptures isn’t dependent on mere will, the key to unleash 
transformative action is “to discern what is concretely realizable among logically 
possible things” or options, or “to recognize what is ‘compossible’ in relation to 
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the situation”. Certain things are impossible (e.g.. a square circle) but other 
things, such as perpetual peace or that the day will come when wealth could be 
equally repartitioned among us all, aren’t. They may not be realizable in given 
time for this or that reason, and neither our strongest will nor our best wishes 
and intentions would suffice to realize them. Only an external element, often a 
technological limitation or its sublation, might change categorically the state of 
the situation, intensifying it and magnetizing our affections . An example would 
be the way in which the fabrication and availability of effective contraceptives 
impacted upon feminist demands for liberation that were always possible but 
not historically sufficient. What was both desirable and possible became also 
concretely compossible and realizable.  This has nothing to do with “objective 
conditions”, but rather with the fact that in their absence militants can always 
engage in destructive-resistant action and create techniques of liberation that 
are just and necessary, which in time can work as part of the effective 
architecture of the free landscape that would emerge, arrive, at an illuminating 
point in time and space (a landscape’s address, as John Berger would say).24        
  What arrives? In Benjamin’s words, “the image of an earth in which every 
place has become an inn. The double meaning of the word Wirtschaft blossoms 
here: all places are worked by human hands, made useful and beautiful thereby; 
all, however, stand like a roadside inn, open to all. An earth that was cultivated 
according to such an image would cease to be part of ‘a world where action is 
never the sister of dream’. On that earth the act would be kin to the dream”. On 
the other hand, we aim to grasp the importance of “the forms that reveal the 
collective dream” of our times.25  
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 We can better appreciate the originality of such an approach, pioneered 
by Benjamin and others in the periphery of the Surrealist movement such as 
Aimé Césaire, in that they are “on guard against the seduction of the myths and 
their inexorable drift toward nothingness”, being just as careful to neglect 
neither the forms of the dream nor the fetish-forms that populate our pathetic 
digital and audiovisual late-capitalist dreamscapes, “those oneiric visions of the 
collective through which the drift toward death can be overcome”. In other 
words, normative and politically speaking, the invitation is to renew our focus on 
prophecy and denunciation, or protest, and utopia26.  
 As Walter Benjamin suggested in a manner that connects his 
conceptualizations and the admiration he felt for the methods and concepts of 
art historian Aby Warburg, quoted above, this is the way to get to the everyday 
material traces of our collective memory “guided by the objects themselves”, in 
contrast with the tendency of museum and gallery exhibitions “to show culture 
in lavish Sunday dress, only rarely in its poor everyday clothes”.27 The 
conceptual figure of such method, combining without ever fusing together the 
opposites of a sudden or overpowering force and a stable pattern that can be 
replicated or iterated in time, is the poor ragpicker, the beggar philosopher and 
the sampler. He’s neither the highbrow aesthete in search for the sublime nor the 
wealthy and assiduous visitor of private galleries, art fairs and biennials, but le 
chiffonier who appears in Baudelaire’s poetry as well as in Aimé Césaire’s 
unclassifiable writings.  
 To critique the tendency to show culture “in lavish dress” is of paramount 
practical as well as theoretical importance, especially in our societies of 
predominant audiovisual production and digital economies of valorization, 
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spatial-temporal displacement and standardization. According to Benjamin the 
tendency is characteristic of mainstream culture, and of a certain relation to 
nature or object-relation. For Benjamin, this mode of object-relation is the 
“technological exploitation of nature by man”, an idea, moreover, “that became 
widespread in the following period”, our period.28  
 Arguably, Benjamin introduces this concept of exploitation prompted by 
Theodor W. Adorno’s criticism of his idea of a “machinery made of men” whose 
institutional “highly complicated organization” would facilitate a “meshing of the 
passions”, posited in relation to Fourier’s utopian vision of socio-economic 
reproductive and productive urban organization (Fourier’s Phalanstery), which 
Benjamin saw as analogous to the modern “city of arcades”. As is known, Adorno 
thought the analogy between Fourier’s Phalanstery and the city of arcades, Paris, 
wasn’t “really clear”.29 
 Further, it can be argued that Benjamin not only introduced and retooled 
a notion of nature exploited by man’s technology in response to Adorno’s 
criticism, but also developed a related but different notion of nature and 
technology, as shown above in relation to second technology,  in which 
“technology appears as the spark that ignites the powder of nature”.30 This was 
based on Marx’s seemingly odd defense of Fourier’s utopian “colossal conception 
of man” as somewhat akin to Hegel’s (and Marx’s own) unmasking of the average 
petty-bourgeois subject behind the grand rhetoric of Man’s rights. 
 Put otherwise, Benjamin’s argument is that the notion of nature that 
corresponds to the mode of object-relation termed by Adorno “identity 
thinking”, entailing the objects’ subsumption as tokens absorbed by 
fundamentally invariant “types”, is absent from Fourier’s socialist utopia. This is 
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because, according to Benjamin, in Fourier technology and nature interact 
explosively –technology being the spark to nature’s powder- which means that a 
second and alternative mode of object-relation can be posited: one in which 
nature’s forces or impulses aren’t reduced to invariant “types” or standards but 
rather act as “bombs”, in the analogy of the shamanic vision-quest, the free play 
of the passions, and the band of brothers and sisters in struggle – the ancient or 
indigenous and ritualistic formulas of intensified physical and psychic 
expression evoked above in relation to Aby Warburg’s and Césaire’s 
(Baudelaireian) genealogy of art and artifices, as well as Ernesto Guevara’s 
gratuity of risk. 
 The incorporation-ingestion of Benjamin’s thought that has occupied a 
great deal of this paper, is possible on the basis of a joint reading of some of the 
texts he composed between 1930 and 1939 on the separation of objects from 
instituting rituals (that functioned as “useless” simulacra in theatrical and 
theological rites) and the “revolutionary negation” of the law (the latter 
including his early 1920 review fragment on the right to use force); specifically, a 
negation of the fundamental aspect of the law regulating human groups’ 
exchange of objects and bodies’ reproduction. In the “Paris Diary”, Benjamin 
referred to “the ancient law of Genesis” in order to highlight this normative 
aspect as the point cutting across the literary work of Baudelaire and Sade (also 
Fourier).31  
 The point is both cosmological and political. Speaking in cosmological 
terms, the fabrication of objects was first inspired by the gods: according to the 
Judeo-Christian cosmology, for instance, while in paradise Eve and Adam had a 
direct relationship to the objects of nature in the garden. Adam and Eve would 
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acknowledge the objects present to him by naming them. The performative force 
of this utterance would make the objects of use themselves inseparable from the 
creative, constitutive or instituting act. With the Fall that relationship changed so 
that “knowledge of good and evil abandons name; it is … the uncreated imitation 
of the creative word”, as Benjamin says.32 Put otherwise, tools, utensils and other 
objects of use lose their “aura” as they can be distinguished from “useless” 
objects or simulacra. If before the latter were full of creative performative force, 
phantasm or spirit, with the advent of technologies of (capitalist) reproduction 
these supposedly “useless” objects survive only by being reduced to quantifiable 
commodities in the so-called art market, thus in fact becoming as reproducible 
and exchangeable as the seemingly distinct tools and utensils. 
 If this is the case, then art objects and objects of use, or fabricated objects, 
aren’t so distinct from each other insofar as they both incarnate an impulse or 
force directed towards creation and procreation – what can be called the 
procreative instinct of the species and the voluptuous passion or affection that 
precedes the act of creation taking place in sex, work or ritual- which is 
“suspended” under the industrial regime and diverted elsewhere, into the 
simulated imitations that populate our world of perverse consumerist 
phantasmagoria, as Benjamin would say.   
 This is precisely what makes us all fetishists under the normativity of the 
industrial regime. On the one hand there’s idolatry, which might in fact predate 
the industrial regime of production as the form of a broader metaphysics of 
inter-subjective and inter-temporal being. The latter should be understood as a 
modality of the constraint of the One over the Many, and conversely, of the Many 
(as unified, native or original, and residually sovereign-divine people) 
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recognizing, confining, limiting and constraining in struggle the (seemingly 
super-human, or divine-mythical) power of the One.  
 This also means that cosmo-political relations may very well extend 
beyond subject-object relations of production typically defined along Cartesian 
or Kantian lines - what the latter called “original acquisition”, or the use of force 
as conquest, with a heroic individual imposing form upon inert matter and 
absorbing it within his own plan. If so, it may be better to speak of 
intersubjective and inter-temporal relations between people, their ancestors and 
the rest of the nonhuman cosmos, none of which are inert. In that case, as 
contemporary anthropologists would say on the basis of widespread 
ethnographic evidence, our average notion of “production” fails to adequately 
describe human praxis in a wider cosmos: for instance, women gardeners don’t 
produce the plants they cultivate, they have a personal relation with them, name 
them and speak to them so as to nurture them and help them grow and survive  
just as Eve and Adam would’ve done in the garden of Eden according to 
Benjamin’s reading of Genesis cosmology. Similarly, it can be said that people 
don’t create the crops but receive them from ancestral sources.33  
 Certain obsessive constraints follow from recognizing such relation, 
which we could term “law”, in the sense of universal negative rules that 
predicate positive structures and at the same time uphold them. These pertain to 
a counter-force, a use of force counter to the mythical violence (conquest, 
original acquisition) that appeals to God’s commands in establishing sovereignty 
and the sovereign’s law. As we’ve seen, Benjamin speaks in this regard of “law-
destroying” or göttliche Gewalt, a force that could also be termed god-destroying 
if not because those opposing the absolute violence and legality of the sovereign 
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(kingship) do so as prophets (rather than chiefs) “from the desire to find a ‘law 
without evil’ and under death; it is in this sense that Christ (the Redeemer) was a 
king”. Here is the prophetic embryo of what one could call the utopian element of 
the state. Violence, or more precisely combat or struggle, plays a crucial role 
here. Ditto, its peculiarity is to simplify, draw lines and classify (civility from 
barbarism, as first technology) where otherwise one might see only complexity; 
but at the same time, conversely, one’s ability to constitute oneself as a single 
people emerges between the possibility and actualization of a relationship of 
combat between the people and the sovereign.34 
 
4.  In Defense of Armed Struggle. 
In their ethnographic fieldwork on the absolute violence and other acts of 
transgression performed by kings and chieftains, acting like gods or like God and 
getting away with it, contemporary anthropologists have in fact recognized the 
dilemma echoed in the modern law-state that Benjamin captured in his 
distinction between “law-making” and “law-maintaining” (as well as “law-
destroying”) violence. “Really it is exactly the same paradox, cast in the new 
language that is necessary once the power of kings (‘sovereignty’) had been 
transferred, at least in principle, to an entity referred to as ‘the people’ -even 
though the exact way in which ‘the people’ were to exercise sovereignty was 
never clear”, writes David Graeber. “No constitutional order can constitute itself 
… The legitimacy of any legal order therefore ultimately rests on illegal acts -
usually, acts of illegal violence”, he concludes. Indeed, as Graeber observes, the 
writers of the U.S. Constitution were guilty of treason in accordance to the legal 
regime under which they were born. Further, whatever solution we were to 
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embrace (leftist periodical peoples’ revolutions, or rightist states of emergency 
or exception) the paradox remains.35  
 Furthermore, it seems to me this is the profound challenge Benjamin left 
us with when he urged us to introduce, enact and institute “a real state of 
emergency”. On the one hand, this means that as we now know full well, 
successful thugs and businessmen can indeed become sovereigns, even create 
new laws and morals, and of course genuine sovereignty does always carry the 
potential for absolute violence. But on the other, people have always known that 
kings need to be tamed -kings and chiefs of state can not only become 
scapegoats, they can also be dramatically set against warriors, enemies, prophets 
rising their voices in the desert against kings or dragging societies towards self-
dissolution in war and so on. The chief can be seen as a kind of enemy and the 
prophet as a kind of warrior and so forth and back again in a cycle.36 
  But central to such theatrical, performative, combat-like dynamic 
(precisely because it is eccentric) is the political ally, the stranger or the 
immigrant, neither local nor enemy. Combat, the peoples’ war, or “armed” 
struggle thus understood has never been about two positions and their strategic 
calculus, and never about simple binaries: everything turns around the political 
ally, this half-local group or volatile yet indispensable groups, which form a 
guerrilla band of uncertainty around each local group recasting such uncertainty 
into certainty, turning internal indivision/individuality into external 
fragmentation and potential affinity, thereby impeding both collective fusion 
under the One and the dispersal of the Many in generalized warfare. It’s in this 
respect that it makes sense to speak of perpetual peace, pace Kant, as the never-
ending search for political allies.  
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 This is also the truth of peacemaking: against Girard, the way out of 
violence isn’t scapegoating but alliance, as in the example given by Achilles and 
Kalchas in the famous “oath by scepter” scene of refusal in Book I of The Iliad. As 
we know, Achilles’ first oath is performed in response to the request Kalchas, the 
seer and sentry of dreams, who fears to say what he knows because of the likely 
violent reaction of King Agamemnon. In his dream-quest, the prophet Kalchas 
has seen that the reason why the god Apollo unleashed a plague upon the 
Achaeans was the latter’s treatment of the Trojan women as a bounty of war, 
specially the daughter of Apollo’s priest, their bodies turned into living currency. 
Achilles then vows to defend Kalchas against the King’s wrath and all those who 
would prohibit his prophecy. His second oath entails a refusal of authority and, 
furthermore, the threat of using deadly force against the King.  
 Crucially, he swears by the scepter “which no longer bears leaves nor 
shoots”, against a life spent and turned into an artifact of culture, a machine 
lending its once-living spirit to support human institutions. Now the dead tree 
has become a victim or an ancestor, a symbol for the promises and legal 
dispensations that in the eyes of Kalchas and his ally Achilles have become 
perverted, stripped of their spirit and legitimacy by the King’s and his clique’s 
abuse of the authority invested in him by the people.37 
  The hurling of the scepter by Achilles is symbolic partly in its 
performative gesture of refusal of the dead-perpetrating culture the scepter now 
indexes, and partly because it indicates our inability to conceal or absorb the 
terror present, not elsewhere, in u-topos (“terror as the other”), but in the most 
proximate immediacy. The scepter’s hurling in the oath by scepter episode of The 
26 
 
Iliad operates as zig-zagging between “wanting to conceal and wanting to 
reveal”, reminding us that it’s “terror as usual”.38  
  At the bottom of this most crucial episode of myth and war lies the 
recognition that there could be only one form of universal communication: “the 
exchange of bodies through the secret language of corporeal signs”, in which the 
lure, arousal and the living object of the affect are one and the same. In this 
respect, Homer’s story isn’t that far from the body of texts invented by 
Baudelaire, Sade and Fourier. What sets the latter apart form the former is the 
same element that separates first and second technology, the essential function 
that money would play as an abstract equivalent in the kind of “universal 
whorehouse” they envisioned as the truth of modern capitalist society (which 
Baudelaire literally saw in one of his dreams).39  
 Arguably, however, that element was already present as the (constrained) 
potential of first technology subjugating nature -specifically, in this case, the 
bodies of women- and their absorption as tokens of invariant types. But what 
sets Fourier apart from Sade, and in a sense closer to Homer’s account of alliance 
in refusal, is the idea of a ritual gesture of denunciation and refusal which is also 
an anticipatory device, a uchronistic/utopian device based on the notion that a 
“direct exchange between individuals could take place at the level of the 
passions” or affects, and that this alliance/exchange could be realized through a 
principle of play -through a dérive of the “spectacles, ritual ceremonies and 
contests” similar to those that Benjamin’s translator and collaborator Pierre 
Klossowski found in the theologia theatrica of the ancients. In other words, 
whereas the Baudelaire-Sadean text indexes and archives the onset of modern 
commercialization of voluptuous affection, within the tradition that goes from 
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Homer to Fourier and the collaboration between Benjamin and Klossowski the 
archive reveals how “even in economics, perversion itself is the ground of value”. 
Or as Benjamin would put it, “the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 
‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule”.40  
We must indeed attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with such 
insight: that voluptuous affection always includes an element of aggression, 
which necessarily presupposes value, importance and appraisal. If this is the 
case, if a price has to be paid, after realizing that it’s “terror as usual” we must 
also accept that even if importance is everywhere it’s up to us to intensify it. To 
do so, to overcome the external perversion of finance-commercial economy (the 
hyper trophy of “needs”) an act of refusal must take place that indexes and forces 
the dissolution of the fictive unity of human individuals, forcing kings and the 
super-rich to overcome the bias of endowments. Perhaps this is what Benjamin 
meant when he said that “it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency”. 
In other words, such is the truth of popular revolutionary justice.  
 Thus, in the case of the Benjaminian reading of Genesis cosmology, Eve 
and Adam didn’t so much cause the law (the injunction to do daily work, produce 
and so on) to be imposed upon them and their successors because of their 
disobedience. Rather, they endured such constraints and invested in the God or 
gods thus instituted by ritually participating in a sort of interspecies kinship or 
alliance with them as well as the rest of creation. The Fall happens every time 
such a (cosmo)political economy, which fully recognizes the inter-temporal 
dimension of the relation between living agents and their dead ancestors or 
“spirits” (the latter being the real “owners” of the means of production), gives 
place to a different political economy: one that freezes time and operating under 
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the assumption that time has frozen, as if it were a still photograph, proceeds to 
establish the illusion of the unity of individuals (which is an external perversion, 
as Klossowski says) and separate them from their predecessors and other 
nonhumans by declaring the latter inert “things” (nature or environment). 
Thereafter, nature and things come to be only as a consequence of the labor force 
or symbolic form instilled into them by possessive individuals (internally united 
in the possession of their bodies, beginning with the bodies of women) with 
exclusive agency. In turn, Civilization and subjects (or civil-subjects and “civil 
society”) appear as distinct from nature and natural peoples under the sign of 
the sovereign One.  
 An inversion takes place here, which turns living historical labor (and 
living, thinking things) from its intensifying and multiplying operation (being in 
motion, like cinema) into dead or frozen labor externally imposed over an 
otherwise inert nature that thereafter exists solely for the satisfaction of an ever-
expanding set of needs or “rights” (perversion). It’s the latter political economy 
(dead labor, external perversion) that is fetishistic, and not the former. For it’s 
the latter that posits human (civil) society as the center of an inert space-time 
universe (nature) onto which it projects its own will and symbolic forms with 
absolute force. In such a hostile universe there’re no allies, only enemies, “them”. 
upon whose dark skins “we” (a fictive unity) must supposedly write the 
greatness of our History.   
 In that sense at least, we’re all fetishists, regardless of whether we’re 
Durkheimian sociologists, Friedmanite quantitative economists, or structural-
functionalist Marxists; and indeed, let me say in this respect (as have others) that 
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we need something like a Copernican Revolution in the social sciences, in law, 
literature and political philosophy. 
 Notice that, on the one hand, this doesn’t mean we must abandon the 
critical position allowed by historical materialism or put Hegel right-side up 
again, as Marshall Sahlins says, for in the cosmopolitical orders of inter-temporal 
dimensions and inter-subjective relations with nonhumans, as well as in their 
antinomian ways and obsessive constraints, their combat and perpetual search 
for peace and political allies, “one may still speak of economic determinism –
provided that the determinism is not economic”.41         
 On the other hand, such obsessive antinomian attitude and constraint, 
which I have provocatively termed “armed” struggle in the way to (rather than as 
the opposite of) peace, present as spirit, collective effervescence, combat, or 
phantasm in institutionalizing or constitutive rituals (exemplified by the oath by 
scepter episode in classical literature, and often imagined as an original 
“contract” authorized by a generic “will” that legitimates law in modern 
literature), is represented under the political economy of the industrial-colonial 
regime in a state of suspension or “emergency”. In this respect, as suggested 
above, the “state of emergency” that according to Benjamin has become the rule 
isn’t the consequence of violence. On the contrary, it’s the attempt to suspend 
combat, to externally impose upon peoples a fictive unity (the unity of their 
‘needs’) and to extract from peoples their ability to use force as well as do battle 
against the sovereign. 
 The state of emergency is thus a state of non-spirit and non-battle, it’s 
“business as usual”. Its example, in the stage set by second technology, is the 
unmanned vehicle of war, the drone driven from a remote location whose 
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vertical vision identifies one as a risky individual and turned at once judge, jury 
and executioner rains fire on us from afar in order to secure “business as usual” 
at home. 
Word count: 9,948 
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